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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
JOSEPH G. TOOTh'IBS,
Plaintiff and App-ellant,
-vs.JACK DONALD TOOMBS, ROLAND J. TOOMBS, individually {
and as Guardian ad litem of the \
said Jack Donald Toombs, a
minor; ALMA TOOMBS,
EDRIS GLASJ\!ANN, and
J. M. TOOMBS,
Defendants a;nd
Respondents,

Case
No. 8665

Appellant's Brief
STATEMENT OF FACTS
This is an appeal by the plaintiff Joseph G. Toombs
from a Decree entered by the Honorable John L. Sevy,
Jr., sitting as Judge of the District Court of Box Elder
County, which Decree was entered on the 27th day of
February, 1957 (R. 520). The action was originally commenced on February 24, 1950, by the filing of a Complaint by the plaintiff for the purpose of impossing a
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constructive trust, with respect to the defendants, Jack
Donald Toombs, Roland J. Toombs, and Alma Toombs,
on certain real property situated in Box Elder County,
near Promontory, Utah, and known as the Cedar Springs
property (R. 490-492). The Plaintiff is the nephew of
the defendant Alma Toombs, and a cousin of Roland J.
Toombs, who is the son of the said Alma Toombs. Jack
Donald Toombs is the son of Roland Toombs, and the
grandson of Alma Toombs. It is therefore evident that
the defendants are in close relationship one with the
other, not only by family but also by reason of their
activities conjointly in operating land adjacent to the
Cedar Springs land in Box Elder County. Since the
action was commenced, the defendant Jack Donald
Toombs has died, so that Roland J. Toombs and Emma
Toombs, his wife, distributees of the estate of Jack Donald Toombs, deceased, have been substituted as parties
defendant in place and instead of the said Jack Donald
Toombs (R. 515). Likewise defendant Edris Glasmann
and J. M. Toombs 'Yere dismissed as parties defendant so
the action now remains against Roland J. Toombs indiidually and Roland J. Toombs and Emma Toombs, his
wife, as distributees of the estate of Jack Donald Toombs,
deceased, and Alma J. rroomhs.
The land involved wns originally acquired in two
separate contiguous trarts consisting of 186% acres and
60 acres. Plaintiff's r.laim, as set forth in his Complaint,
js twofold: With respert to the 186%-acre tract, plaintiff
~laims that he is the ow·ner of an undivided l/3 interest
therein by reason of having joined "rith his father, Jo-

2
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seph M. Toombs, back in approximately 1906, in purchasing this land from the defendant Alma Toombs. Plaintiff further claims that he paid through labor a sum
equivalent to 1/3 of the purchase price and has at all
times since the time of purchase been the owner of a l/3
undivided interest, although the title to the property was
taken in the name of Joseph M. Toombs.
The other theory of plaintiff's claim for a constructive trust relates to the entire tract of property consisting
of 2461j2 acres (independently of the 1/3 undivided interest claimed by the plaintiff as to a 1/3 interest in the
186¥2 acres). With respect to the entire tract of land
the plaintiff claims that at the time the title to the property was acquired by them, said defendants were under
obligation to the plaintiff by oral agreement to acquire
said land for him and in his name, and that because of
such agreement and by reason of their relationship one
with the other and to the plaintiff, the court should impose a constructive trust on the property for the benefit of the plaintif. (R. 490-492)
In their Answer first filed herein, defendants
admitted:
"That on or about the 21st day of March, A. D.
1913, plaintiff and his father, J. M. Toombs, purchased from the defendant Alma Toombs land
in Box Elder County, State of Utah, described as
follows: The SW% of Section 34, Township 11
North, Range 7 West, S.L.M.; also, beg. at the
SE corner of the SWlJ., of said section 34, thence
running East 53 rods, thence North 80 rods, thence
3
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West 53 rods, thence South 80 rods to beg., containing 1861/2 acres, more or less.'' (R. 493)
Defendants further admitted:
''that the defendant Alma Toombs, on or about
the 20th day of October, A. D. 1948, entered into
an oral agreement with and between the plaintiff
to purchase certain described land in the county of
Box Elder, State of Utah, in consideration whereof the plaintiff was to reconvey certain land located in Box Elder County, State of Utah, to the
defendant, Alma Toombs. That the defendant
Alma Toombs purchased and paid for said land
and had the same placed in the name of his grandson, Jack Donald Toombs, a minor." (R. 494)
As a "Second Defense" to plaintiff's Complaint, and
by further answer to paragraph V of plaintiff's Complaint, defendants alleged that the oral agreement with
and between plaintiff and defendant Alma Toombs:
''was simply one for the purchase and sale of real
estate. Under said agreement the parties above
named were dealing \Yith each other as co-principals and not as principal and agent. Therefore,
the oral agreement fails '"ithin the pronsions of
Title 33, Chap. 5, Section 3 of the lftah Code Annotated 1943, providing that e\er~~ contract for the
sale of land or an interest therein shall be void
unless the contract or some note or memorandum
thereof is in "~riting. Further . that the agreement 0ntered into between the parties above
named "~as one for the joint benefit of both parties.
Said agreement cannot be enforced under the provisions of Utah Code Annotated above cited, unless the same, or some memorandum, is in writing." (R. 494)
4
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This Answer was filed in the Court on March 17,
1950. Thereafter, on March 25, 1950, defendants filed an
Amended Answer in which the admissions made as set
out above were eliminated and the allegations of the
Complaint with respect to such matters were denied
(R. 497, 498).
Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint September 7, 1950
(R. 500-505), which was answered by the defendants on
September 22, 1950 (R. 506-510). The case was tried by
the Court without a jury beginning December 4, 1950
(R 1), and was taken under advisement on January 13,
1951, at the conclusion of the trial.
Counsel for the respective parties filed written briefs
with the Court. Thereafter, on March 17, 1952, the Court
rendered a Memorandum Decision stating generally that
the Court found "in favor of the defendants and against
the plaintiff, no cause of action." The Court further directed defense counsel to prepare Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law and Decree ''in accordance herewith." Notwithstanding this direction, no action was
taken by defendants or their counsel until after plaintiff,
in February, 1956, filed a Motion requesting the Court ''to
withdraw its Memorandum Decision filed herein, and to
reopen the case for the purpose of allowing counsel to
reargue and resubmit the matter either with or without
additional testimony" (R. 512). During the interim of
approximately four years numerous attempts had been
made by counsel for plaintiff to have the Court enter
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Decree, and
5
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the Court in turn had made numerous requests upon defense counsel to prepare Findings, Conclusions, and
Decree. As stated by plaintiff's counsel in the Motion to
Reopen, counsel for defendant had "neglected, failed,
and refused to submit any Findings to the Court, so that
the Court has not been in a position fully and completely
to pass upon the merits of the case, and to make an intelligent and complete analysis of the issues for the purpose of preparing and making its Findings and
Conclusions herein'' (R. 512, 513).
This Motion was argued before the Court on April
11, 1956, up to which time counsel for defendants had still
failed to draft any proposed Findings, Conclusions, or
Decree. Following the argument on !lotion the Court
refused to reopen the case and again directed defendants
to prepare Findings and Conclusions to be submitted for
approval and signature. Such Findings, Conclusions, and
Decree 'vere submitted and signed by the Court on February 27, 1957.
STATEMENT OF POINTS
In connection wi t.h this appeal, Plaintiff contends:
1. The trial court erred in refusing to reopen the
ease after a lapse of more than :fiye years after the case
had been tried and more than four years after counsel for
defendants had failed to prepare Findings and Conclusions for the Court's approval.

2. The Findings as ultimately entered by the Court
on Februa.ry 27, 1957, are not supported by the evidence

6
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but are contrary thereto insofar as the Findings are in
favor of the defendants and against plaintiff.
3. The Judgment and Decree are not supported by
the evidence.
4. The evidence in the case requires a finding that
Plaintiff is the owner of a 1/3 undivided interest in and
to approximately 1861;2 acres by reason of having purchased the same with his father, J. M. Toombs.
5. The evidence requires a finding by the Court that
defendants hold the real property in question in trust for
the use and benefit of the plaintiff upon the payment by
the plaintiff of the amount paid by defendants for said
property, and that defendants should account to plaintiff
for all the rents, issues, and profits received by them from
said property during the time the same has been in their
possession.
For convenience of the Court and to consolidate the
foregoing points for argument, plaintiff proposes to
argue the same under the following categories:
I. Error of the trial court in failing to find that
plaintiff is the owner of a 1/3 undivided interest in approximately 1861;2 acres of land purchased by him with
his father, J. M. Toombs.
II. Error of the trial court in failing to impose a
constructive trust in respect to all of the real property
consisting of approximately 2461h acres and requiring
defendants to account to plaintiff for the rents, issues and
profits received therefrom.

7
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III. Error of the trial court in refusing to reopen
the case.
ARGUMENT
I
ERR.OR OF THE TRIAL COURT IN FAILING TO
FIND THAT PLAINTIFF IS THE OWNER OF A
1/3 UNDIVIDED INTE-REST IN APPROXIMATELY 1861!2 ACRES OF LAND PURCHASED BY IDM
WITH HIS FATHER, J. M. TOOMBS.

In order for the Court to make an accurate appraisal
of the evidence of this case as it relates to Appellant's
Points I and II, a synopsis of the testimony of each of
the witnesses is herein reported.
The plaintiff Joseph G. Toombs testified that he and
his father bought the quarter section of land in 1907
(R. 8) and that the deed was issued in about 1913 (R·. 15).
In 1948 plaintiff learned that his sister Edris Glasmann
had obtained a deed from their father to the property;
(R. 23) that thereafter plaintiff had made several attempts to purchase the property and on one occasion had
accepted an offer made to him by :Jirs. Glasmann, through
her husband, to purchase the property for Forty-five
Hundred Dollars ($4,500.00). However, this offer and
aeceptance had been "Tithdrawn by ~Irs. Glasmann so
that he did not get the property for that amount
(R. 24-30).
Plaintiff talked on several occasions to the defendant Alma Toombs (his uncle and brother of Joseph
8
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Toombs, the father) about buying the property. On one
occasion (the day before the property was acquired) the
defendant Alma Toombs came to his home and in the
presence of other witnesses drew on a notebook a diagram of the property showing that a house and othe·r
improvements (which Alma Toombs believed was on his
property adjoining) was in fact on the property in question. This diagram was identified as Exhibit No. 2 and
admitted in evidence (R. 30-32). At that time Alma
agreed with the plaintiff that if the plaintiff would sell
Alma approximately two acres on which said improvements were located, said defendant Alma Toombs would
go down to Ogden and purchase the property in question
for the plaintiff. Plaintiff agreed to allow Alma to do
this and thereupon did not go to Ogden the following
morning when the property was sold. (R. 30-32) In fact,
plaintiff testified that when he was contacted by telephone
he told them to sell .the property to AI. (R. 89) Upon
returning from Ogden Alma told the plaintiff that he had
bought the property and agreed to get together in a day
or two and fix the matter up (R. 33). Thereafter plaintiff saw the defendant Roland Toombs and at that time
Roland stated that the title to the land had been put in
the hands of Roland's son. (R. 33)
On cross-examination the plaintiff testified that his
sister Edris Glasmann and the others would not have
given him a chance to buy the property if it were not for
the fact that plaintiff's father had insisted and that if
plaintiff's father "were here today he would testify to
it." (R. 89) He identified Exhibit 3 which is an Affidavit
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executed by the father Joseph Toombs with respect to
the property. Exhibit 3 was admtted in evidence; (R. 109110) and reads in part as follows :
''A number of years ago my son, Joseph and I, entered into an agreement with my brother, Alma
rroombs, whereby we agreed to purchase 186.50
acres of ground in Sec. 34, Twp. 11 N.R. 7 W.,
SI~~i, known as Cedar Springs property in Box
Elder County, Utah. This is sage brush land with
some cedars on it. 11y son Joseph fenced part of
same about four years ago, and I told him to go
ahead and use the land, or my share of same, for
pasture, to reimburse him for the work and material for fencing. Before that time it was a part of
the open range.
* * * * *
'' Sometime ago I made a deed in favor of my
daughter Edris Glasmann as I was owing doctor's
bill and hospital fee, coYering the 186.50 acres
known as the Cedar Springs property.... I advised my son-in-la,,, A. I~. Glasmann that my son
Joseph "Tas to have the first chance to buy the
land at Cedar Springs for a less price that other
people "Tould pa~T for same, and I wanted the
money obtained from the sale to pay my hospital
and doctor bills.''
The plaintiff further testified that he and his Uncle
''AI'' had Ya rious business dealings in the past~ that they
had worked quite elosely together; and that plaintiff
plneed considerable trust and confidence in his uncle,
pa rtienlarly in ngTee_ing to let him go down to Ogden and
buy the property for the plaintiff. (R. 100)
Arnold Christensen testified that he had agreed to
mal{e a bid of Five Thousand Dollars ($5,000.00) for the

10
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Cedar Springs property on behalf of Joseph G. Toombs,
the plaintiff. On cross-examination he described the
transaction as follows :
''A. Well, they mentioned that. The question
was put to me, or I put it up to them. I came to
buy the place and asked them what they had.
Asked them if it would be fair if they gave me the
bid. They mentioned the highest bid. I said, 'If
I beat the bid I want to buy it.' And they agreed
to do that. They agreed to sell me the land. If
I beat the bid what they were bid, and I bid them
$5,000 cash. Then they wanted to give their Uncle
Al a chance. This one lady said, 'We better give
Uncle Al a chance.' ''
* * * * *
''A. Well, when I came back again about a week
after, I honked him out and he came out to my
car and he said, 'You won't need to go any more
to make a bid on it. My Uncle Al is bidding it in
for me.' ''
Alexander Dickey testified that in the year 1942 while
on a wate rsurvey at Cedar Sprngs he had a conversation with Alma Toombs, who was constructing a granary
on a water survey a.t Cedar Springs he had a conversation. The conversation also included Mr. Joseph G.
Toombs, the plaintiff. At that time Alma. Toombs pointed
out to Mr. Dickey the dividing line between Alma Toombs'
property and the property belonging to Joseph G. Toombs
and stated to Mr. Dickey that Joseph G. Toombs owned
a l/3 interest in the field lying adjacent to his (Alma
Toombs) land and immediately south of his house.
(R. 124, 125) He further testified that J. M. Toombs, father of the plaintiff, told the witness that plaintiff owned
11
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62lf2 acres of the Cedar Springs property and that he had
fed cattle for it. (R. 124)
Mr. Dickey testified that on the evening of October
18, 1948, when he was about to go into the home of plaintiff and had gotten out of his car, another car pulled up
ahead of him and because of that the witness did not go
into the· home but decided to come back the next day. The
following morning Joseph Toombs told him that his Uncle
'' Al'' had gone down to Ogden to buy the Cedar Springs
property for plaintiff. (R. 132)
On cross-examination Mr. Dickey testfied that the
reason he had gone to J. ~I. Toombs was that he was interested in finding out who discovered Cedar Springs
(R. 128). He again repeated that J. M. Toombs told him
that Joe owned about 62% acres which he had paid for
by feeding cattle for Alma Toombs. (R. 128-129)
Edward L. Thorsted testified that he is the son-inlaw of the plaintiff; that he was in plaintiff's home in the
forepart of October, 1948, when a conversation took place
involving Alma Toombs and his wife, Joseph Toombs and
his "Tifc, and the ''Titness and his wife. That on such occasion he was introdueed to . .:\Jma Toombs who seemed
excited about a laud surYey 'Yhich had just been made
which had found that his home and granary and water
troughs were oYer on Joe's property. On that occasion
Alma Toombs told plaintiff:
"A. . .. 'I ,II purchase all that land for you,
.Joe, if you 'viii s0ll me that small portion that my
houst) nnd granary and the water trough is on.'

12
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And father-in-law says, 'You know that I own that
portion of land,' and he says, 'Yes, I remember
you worked for that and paid for it.' Well, my
father-in-law says, 'Well, if you purchase that
land,' he says, 'I '11 give you that small portion of
land your property is on.' And Mr. Alma Toombs
says, 'That would be swell.' He says he didn't
want there's fellow named Christensen that he
mentioned that he said he didn't want him to get
hold of the land, because he was sure he wouldn't
be able to purchase the land from him, and he
would lose his home and all.'' (R 135)
Wayne Toombs, plaintiff's son, testified that he and
his father ran cattle and horses on the Cedar Springs
property for as long as he could remember. He detailed
the manner and method of operating the Cedar Springs
property from 1939 until1948. (R.141) He further stated
that for several years during this period of time he and
his father had exchanged with the defendant Alma
Toombs use of the Cedar Springs property and the property which Alma Toombs owned adjacent thereto. (R.
144, 145) He further testified to a conversation which his
father and Alma Toombs had just prior to ''Peach Day''
in the latter part of August or the first part of September, 1948, as follows:
''A. Well, I drove up in front of the place and
dad and AI was sitting on the fence there talking
about the Cedar Springs property at that time.
And dad was telling him, 'I don't believe they'd
sell it to me, because . . . they were mad at me. '
And Al said he would go down and buy it for my
father.

'' Q. What did your father say to that?
13
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''A. Well, dad said that he'd be glad to have
him do, because he wanted it.'' (R. 146, 147)
The witness testified that later in October he overheard a conversation between defendant Alma Toombs
and his father as follows:
"Al was pretty excited about the property at Cedar Springs. He said they had it surveyed and he
found out that his house and his barn and hls corrals, water trough, \Vas over on the Cedar Springs
property there. And he said he had been down to
try to buy that piece of ground off from them, but
they would not sell it to him. He said he could
buy it all, but he didn't want it all because he had
enough ground as it was and he wanted dad to buy
it, and Al said he would go buy it for him."
(R. 148)
After a deed had been obtained to the land in the
name of the defendant Jack Toombs, several conversations occurred between the plaintiff Joseph Toombs and
the defendant Roland Toombs or Alma Toombs or both.
The witness testified that on one occasion in the presence
of a Jfr. David Richards the following conversation took
place:
'' .1\. ''7 e discussed the boundaries. We drew the
place out on a piece of board and w·e ''ere discussing ho\v things \rer(~ there. Roland said he
would like to keep four rods east of the house and
running north over to the end of that forty. And
I snid, •Well, gosh! you don't need that much.'
'\V(1 ll,' l1e said, '1\1 like to keep on a straight
ft~nce.' We asked him "Thy he "'"anted it, and he
Raid he didn't have no dooryard left there if he
didn't get some ground there. ..A. nd \Ye told him
we wouldn't let him has·e the four rods clear

14
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through, but we agreed to let him have two rods
in front of his house and leave the fence south of
his house where it was. As Roland went to go he
says, 'Well,' he says, 'My father has gone to California. I would like to wait until he gets back before I turn the deeds.' We said, 'How long will
that be~' And he says, 'About three weeks.' Well,
we agreed that probably that "\vas all right."
(R. 154)
Nellie Toombs, wife of the plaintiff, testified as to
her knowledge of the use and occupation of the land in
question by the plaintiff during the years preceding 1948.
With respect to the conversation which occurred in their
home in the early part of October, 1948, the witness
testified:
"A. Well, he told Joe that it was a big section
and he just had it surveyed, and, of course, I told
that once. The improvements were all over on
Joe's land. He says, 'I don't know what I'm going
to do. I've been down to Ogden to buy this land,
and they won't sell it to me.' And he seemed very
angry at the Glasmanns. He says, 'They're trying
to sell the water to Brownings, and Christensen
and Mr. Hendricks are trying to buy the land also,
and I don't want them in there. Now, Joe, he
says, 'I've got all the land I want. I don't want
any more, and if you want me to buy this land for
you.' He says, 'You can't buy it if you go down
there. They're mad at you, they won't sell it to
you.' He says, 'I'll go down and buy it. I think
I can buy it.' Then he asked Joe if he'd give him
this two acres, deed him this two acres, and Joe
says, 'I '11 give you the two acres if you get the
land for me, Uncle AI.' " (R. 181, 182)
The witness further testified that she was present
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the night before Alma Toombs went to Ogden to purchase
the land at which time the following conversation ensued:
''A. He says, 'Joe, they're selling the place in
the morning.' And Joe says, 'Yes, I've heard
they are.' And he says, 'They're goiong to call
you up, but,' he says, 'You turn that down, because they will not sell it to you.' He says, 'Your
dad wants you to have it, but Glasmann does not
want you to have it, but I can buy it.' And he
says, 'If you '11 secure my property around there,
those two acres, I '11 go down and buy it and turn
it over to you.' " (R. 184, 185)
OWEN L. BROUGH testified that he was the County
Treasurer of Box Elder County between 1935 and 1947.
He identified plaintiff's Exhibit 6 as comprising tax
notices for several years; that he had a personal recollecton of having received taxes from Joe Toombs and
that Joe Toombs had paid taxes on the Cedar Springs
property in the years 1939 and 1942 of his own recollection. (R. 200, 204)
D.A_ VID RICHARDS, an elderly gentlemen of 70
years of age, testified that he was acquainted with the
Cedar Springs land and that he had arranged with Joe
rl,oombs on many occasions to run cattle on the property.
He was present at a conversation 'vhieh occurred between
.Joe 'roombs and the defendant Roland Toombs in the
month of November, 1948, at the plaintiff~s home . .LL\._t this
c-onversation W nyne '\Tayne Toombs "·as also present.
rrhe 'vi tness 1<.\stified as follo"·s:

"Q. And will you tell us "·hat took place at that
time'?
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''A. Why, this gentleman back here, Roland
Toombs, he came around the south of the house
here and stepped up to Joe and Wayne and he
says, 'Joe,' he says, 'I've come to see what you
intend to do about that Cedar Springs property.'
Joe says, 'Just as I agreed to do.' He says, 'What
was that agreement~' He says he agreed to turn
that part of the barn and house is over to his father if he would buy the other part for him.

'' Q.

Then what was

said~

"A. Then he says, 'We had them put it in Jack's
name to keep him out of the draft,' and he says,
'If you let us keep it in Jack's name until spring,
we '11 turn it over to you.'

"Q. What if anything did Joseph Toombs

say~

"A. Well, he got kind of huffy and says, 'What
did you do that for~ I don't know what you put
it in his name for. You had no right to.' "
(R. 212, 213)
ABINADI TOLMAN testified that he was well
acquainted with the parties to the matter as well as with
the property in question; that he had discovered from
examination of the records that the title to the land appeared to be in the name of J. M. Toombs and had therefore contacted Mr. J. M. Toombs for the purpose of leasing the property on an Oil and Gas Lease (215-217). At
that time Mr. J. M. Toombs told the witness that his son
Joseph G. (plaintiff) owned the north third or 62¥2 acres
of the property (R 2173. Mr. Tolman likewise gave an
accurate account of the conversation which took place in
the home of the plaintiff on the evening preceding the sale
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of the land in question. He fixed the date as October 18th,
and testified concerning Alma's promise:
''A. Well, he said, 'If you go down '-he said,
'Your father wants you to get the place.' And he
said, 'If you should go down there, Joe, you'd
only get in a squabble with your sisters, and I've
made arrangements that I can buy the place, but
I don't need it and don't want it. If you will deed
me the land that my house and granary is on.'
Later in the conversation he repeated it several
times. He said, 'My house and the trough, water
trough.' And then Joe says, 'Well, how is that~'
'Well,' he said, 'I've had Mr. Griffiths out and
survey it, and he finds that's a large section, and
so he said in equalizing the land there my house
eomes under your 62¥2 acres.' And so he took his
finger and he drew how it was, and then he said
to ~frs. Toombs, 'HaYe you got a piece of paper
here!' And ~frs. Toombs got up and she turned
the light on as she did. The light didn't shine direretly at me, but I c.ould see :Jir. Alma Toombs
because he sat directly from me, but I was in the
shadows of the lamp. ..A.nd she got the paper and
he dre"'" how it "·as. ...lnd he had, running frqm
the quarter section, running east, he drew it so
you could see it "·as crooked running off a good
many degrees north of east, but he took his pencil
after he got through and said, •This is all I want
is this pieee right here. It's about t"·o or two and
a half acres.' " (R. :2~1, :2:2~)
He identified the \Yriting as Plaintiff~s Exhibit 3 and

fu rt.her t<.)s t i:fied :
''A. 'Well,' he said, 'your father "Tants you to
hav(\ it, ,Joe,' and he said, 'They'll call you in the
morning. They'll call you in the morning, and all
you have to do is say that I'm going to buy it.'

18

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

And I don't know. Of course, in the conversation
that came up several times during the time he was
there." (R. 221, 223)
LOIS THORSTED, daughter of plaintiff, testified
that she worked in the Box Elder County Treasurer's
Office from 1938 to 1945 and was acquainted with the
procedure for mailing tax notices ; that she was likewise
acquainted with the Cedar Springs property. (R. 228, 230)
During the time she worked in the Treasurer's Office her
father paid the taxes on the Cedar Springs property each
year except for two occasions, on when she paid them and
one when her grandfather J. M. Toombs paid them.
(R. 321)
On cross-examination she testified that her father
paid the taxes on the Cedar Springs property in cash
while he paid taxes on other property in his own name
by check, stating to her that he did not want to get the
matter mixed up for income tax purposes. R. 239)
In addition to the foregoing witnesses who testified
for plaintiffs, plaintiff introduced portion of depositions
of defendants taken by plaintiff, in which defendants
testified as follows :
ALMA TOOMBS testified plaintiff asked him if he
would go down and get a deed for the plaintiff and Alma
told plaintiff he would do so. ( R. 344) After the property
had been purchased the defendant testified that ''Roland
agreed to turn it over to him.'' Roland ''came in and told
me he was going to let Joe have it back." (R. 347)
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Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

ROLAND TOOMBS testified that he knew plaintiff
<·.laimed an interest in the property before he went to
()gden about buying it; (R. 349) that his father Alma
said he had promised to buy it for plaintiff and "I heard
him say he would buy this before I went to Ogden.'' This
could have been as much as two weeks or more before land
\Vas acquired. (R. 351)
Subsequent to obtaining the deed there was a cont't·rence at the home of Alma Toombs, at which defendants Alma, Roland and Donald as well as plaintiff and
Wayne Toombs, son of the plaintiff, were present. This
meeting w·as arranged for the purpose of discussing turning over the deed on the property to plaintiff. Roland testified that at that time he was going to turn the property
over to the plaintiff if they could agree about protecting
Roland on the house and yard in the corner of the prop<._)rty. (R. 354, 335) He ''as concerned about being protected because the surYey which had been made showed
that the house and yard were on the adjoining land. (R.
:135, :156) He further testified that plaintiff told him he
eould keep \Yhat he \Ynnted around the house and that the
defPIHlant Roland stated that he ""anted to keep ten rods.
Defendant Roland then testified .... I "·as going to town
and \\·<.) could fix it up there, and come to find it had to be

RnrYPycd oY<.)r ag-ain, and I told him \Ye couldn •t do it until
spring. We had to take an engineer out and get it
Ht.raig-htt~llPd

up." (R. :i:J(), 357)

,JACI{ D<)NALD TOOMBS testified that he ha.d
heard plaintiff eluim n one-third interest in the Cedar
20
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Springs property as early as about 1940. (R. 359, 360)
He also testified that he didn't go to Ogden the day that
the property was going to be sold, that he had been down
there before but he didn't go down there on that day;
(R. 360) that "We had talked about it and decided we
had to do it because it was close to our house, and we
didn't know exactly where the line was.'' (R. 361) He
likewise remembered the conference at the home of Alma
Toombs shortly after the property was purchased. The
various parties met there by appointment and "We told
them that we'd sell it to them if we could agree on the
terms around the house and that, and we didn't come to
any agreement then. They were going to leave it until
next spring." (R. 363) He also knew that this grandfather Alma, had agreed to go talk to the sisters about purchasing the property for the plaintiff. (R. 363, 364)
Much of the evidence introduced by defendants corroborates plaintiff's position in this matter, although contradicting plaintiff in respect to some of the claimed conversations which took place before the property was purchased. The evidence introduced by defendant is summarized briefly as follows :
A. L. GLASMANN testified that plaintiff had stated
that he wanted to buy the property and that the witness
had told plaintiff there was no reason why he couldn't.
(R. 247) The vvitness later talked to Arnold Christensen
about selling the land to him. (R. 248) The Plaintiff's father had ''expressed desire that Joe be given privilege
of buying this land at the best figure offered by anybody
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else. So I had Mr. Gale, who was my other brother-in-law
and is also my auditor, call Joe Toombs up.'' (R. 249)
This call apparently took place the morning that defendant Alma Toombs and Roland came to Ogden to buy the
property. The witness testified he heard Mr. Gale talk
to the plaintiff and that he also talked to the plaintiff at
which time plaintiff stated he was not interested in purchasing the property. (It is interesting to note that Mr.
Gale testified that he was the only one who talked to plaintiff on the telephone.)
The witness further testified he had sent plaintiff a
letter dated October 14,1948 (Defendant's Exhibit "A"),
in " . hich he had stated that "Your younger sisters are all
pretty sore at the way you have tried to shirk your duties
in regard to your father, etc. They ha\e asked me to institute suit against you if I can find any basis for a suit
for the past use of the lands owned by your father and
used by you for the last 40 years without adequate payment." The letter also stated that :Jlrs. Glasmann had
agre0d to sell the land to someone else on October 19th
for the sum of Fi,. e Thousand Dollars ($5,000.00) unless
she rt>reived a higher bid. (R. 260) Previous to this time
dPfendant Alma Toombs had talked to the witness about
wanting just a piece of the property: (R·. ~61, 262) that
the only persons to "·hom ,,. itness talkt"}d about buying the
property "·erP Roland Toombs and Alma Toombs.
(R. ~56)

IIA I~OLD F. 0 ALE test:fied that he "\Yas employed by
the (lg-dtlll Standard-Examiner and "\vas a brother-in-law
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of the witness A. L. Glasmann. (R. 265) In the middle of
1948 plaintiff stated that he owned a one-third of the Cedar Springs property. (R. 266) He testified that he called
the plaintiff on October 20, 1948, and said:
''Joe, Al and Roland is here to buy the property.'
And I says, 'Do you want it~ I've just left your
father and Mrs. Glasmann, and they wanted me
to give you the first chance to buy the property.'
And he says, 'Harold I don't want it. It isn't
worth that money to me.' And so I said, 'Joe, the
family is going to sell it so is all right with you~'
And he says, 'It's all right with me.' So from
then we sold it to Jack. I made out the deed that
day and J a.ck bought the property." (R. 267)
The property was paid for by Roland Toombs and
Alma Toombs each giving a check for one half. (R. 268)
The checks were introduced as Defendants' Exhibit ''F.''
On cross-examination Mr. Gale testified that defendant Alma Toombs had previously mentioned that his
house was on a small portion of the Cedar Springs property and he wanted to he protected. (R. 272) That he
alone talked to plaintiff on the telephone (R. 272) at
which time he told plaintiff that Alma and Roland were
there to buy the property and the plaintiff told witness
to sell it to him. (R. 282) Prevously, plaintiff's father
had told the witness to be sure to give plaintiff a first
chance to buy the property. (R. 272) He knew the plaintiff had been using the land for 40 years. (R. 275) By
way of conclusion he further testified that he was interested in seeing that the conveyance made by Mrs. Glasmann to the defendants "remain as is." (R. 282)
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MYRTLE E. TOOMBS (who was present in the
court room during previous testimony after the court had
made an order of exclusion but was nevertheless permitted to testify over objection of the plaintiff) testified that she is a sister-in-law of the plaintiff. That she
had never heard plaintiff claim to own a third interest in
the Cedar Springs property although she had not seen
him a great deal over the past years. (R. 284-286)
DEO LOUISE GALE testified that she is the wife of
Harold Gale and a sister of the plaintiff. (R. 290) In the
spring of 1948 when her father went to the hospital, plaintiff told her he thought he ought to have ''Cedar,'' (R.
293) but she did not hear him claim to own a third interest in the property. (R. 293) She had attempted to contact
plaintiff on several occasions but was not successful.
WheneYer a bid was receiYed on the property it would be
communicated to their father "Who repeatedly said, "Give
,Joe another chance,'' so the girls would hold the property.
(R. 302)
GlTSSIE RAY Sl\fiTH testified that she is a sister
to plaintiff and liYes in Palo ~\Ito~ California. (R. 305)
She neYer knc"T plaintiff claimed an interest in the Cedar
Springs propPrty until the trouble started. (R.. 307) "When
~liP tnlked 1o thP plaintiff at the time her father -was in
the hospi tnl in l~l+S~ plaintiff "~oul dsay, d Don ~t you think
I should llaYP (\,dar~~ and "Don~t ~Ton think it belongs
to me.'' (I~. 308)
\V. II. Gl~IFFITHS "~a.s called :first as a "~itness for
dt~fendaut a11d later as a "Tituess for the plaintiff. He
24

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

testified that he was the County Surveyor. (R. 312) According to a notation made in his day book (Defendants'
Exhibit "H"), he was out at the Alma Toombs property
west of Promontory on October 17, 1948, for the purpose
of making a survey for a water filing for Alma Toombs.
At that time he was concerned with establishing the
northeast corner of the southwest quarter of the section,
where the water location would be filed. (R. 321) At that
time he determined that the section vvas a large section.
(R. 324) He testified that he also determined that part of
Alma's house and the area to the south within the fence
enclosure was south of the quarter section line which
would place it on the property here involved; and that he
told Alma and Roland of this discovery. (R. 418, 419)
ALMA TOOMBS, one of the defendants and uncle
to the plaintiff, testified he bought the land in question
from the State and sold it to plaintiff's father. (R. 327)
He went dovvn to Ogden in the latter part of October at
the request of plaintiff to see the Glasmanns and the gir Is
about plaintiff buying the property at Cedar Springs.
(R. 328, 329) He testified that when he eame back from
Ogden he told plaintiff he wouldn't buy the property for
him because plaintiff could buy it for himself. (R. 330)
On cross-examination he testified that he knew plaintiff had run cattle over the property in question for manyyears. (R. 339) He admitted that in his deposition he
knew of plaintiff's claim to one-thrd of the Cedar Springs
property before he had gone done to Ogden to do anything about buying the property; (R,. 337) that he had
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talked to plaintiff two or three times about going down to
buy the property for him. (R. 338) He further remembered a meeting which took place at his home shortly
after the property had been purchased at which he, his
son Roland, his grandson, Jack, the plaintiff, and plaintiff's son \Vayne were present. At that time Roland
agreed to turn the land over to the plaintiff (R. 340)
LILLIAN TOOMBS testified that she is the wife of
the defendant Alma Toombs and knew he had gone to
Ogden in the fall of 1948 to purchase the property for
the plaintiff. (R. 367) However, she testified that later
she heard Alma tell plaintiff that he could go himself that
he didn't want to have anything more to do with it. (R.
368, 369)
JOE BROWN testified that he lived in Promentory,
Utah, and was employed by the defendant Roland
Toombs; that he had certain conversations with Wayne
and that he had been present in the spring of 1949 when
conversations had taken place between the parties to this
matter. (R. 375)
EDRIS GLASMANN testified that she is the wife of
A. L. Glasma.nn and a sister of the plaintiff; (R. 391) that
she and her father had paid the taxes each year on the
property in question and identified Defendants' Exhibit
''I'' as being a group of the tax notices ·w·hich had been
paid. However, on voir dire she could not remember any
dates on which taxes had been paid. (R. 392) She testified that plaintiff had talked about getting their father to
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pital of March 1948, (R. 397) but she never knew that
plaintiff claimed a third interest in the property. (R. 398)
She further testified that several weeks before the
property was sold the defendant Alma talked to her about
buying it, stating he wanted it for his grandson but never
mentioned that he was there to buy it for the plaintiff.
(R. 399-401) She believed he offered Four Thousand Dollars ($4,000) for the property at that time. (R. 407) Although she called on defendant Alma Toombs in Brigham City to discuss the matter of purchasing the property, she never called on the plaintiff. (R. 402)
On cross-examination she testified that the land had
been given to her by their father to sell to pay his expenses and that her father wanted plaintiff to have the
first chance to buy the property. (R. 403) She was in the
process of checking on the value of the property and
finding a buyer for it from the time she got the deed on
July 15, 1948 until the property was sold in Oc.to her of
that year. (R. 403, 404) To show her attitude and animosity toward the plaintiff we quote her testimony as
follows:
'' Q. As a matter of fact you have never been to
his home to talk to him about this property, have
you~

''A.

Neither has he to mine.

''Q. Well, have you been to his
"A.

home~

N o, s1r.
.

'' Q. All right. You knew that he has a home in
Brigham City~

''A.

I've been told.
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"Q.

And you've also been told that you're his

sister~

''A. I've been told that.
'' Q. Do you resent the fact that you are his
sister~

''A. I'm not answering that.
"Q. Do you bear any animosity towards your
brother Joe~
"A. I'm not answering that." (R. 404)
WILL· M. JACOBSEN testified that he is a son-inlaw of the defendant Alma Toombs and lives at ~fantua,
•
Utah. (R. 419) He had never heard plaintiff claim a onethird interest in the Cedar Springs property, nor had he
ever asked plaintiff if he owned any property. (R. 422)
ROLAND J. TOOMBS, one of the defendants, testified that he talked to the plaintiff about October 18, 1948,
on Forrest Street in Brigham City, Utah, after he had received a letter, Defendants' Exhibit "J.'' (R. 424-427)
At that time plaintiff said he did not want the property.
(R. 425) He likewise testified that he was the one who
went to Ogden to put in a bid and bought the property for
his son. ( R. 428) (Note, this testimony is contradictory
to the finding of the court to the effect that the transaction of the sale and purchase of the property '' \Yas negotiated by Alma Toombs, grandfather, of Jack Donald
Toombs as agent and for the use and benefit of Jack Donald Toombs." (R. 517) He paid one-half of the purehase
price, his father paid the other half, and the deed was
taken in the name of the defendant Jack Donald Toombs.
(R. 429) Since that time Jack has paid a. portion of the
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purchase price back. (R. 431) In January of 1949 they
had a meeting at his father's home at which his father and
Joseph Toombs got into an argument about whether the
father had agreed to buy the prperty for Joe but at the
conclusion of the meeting Roland asked his son Jack,
"What do you think~ Think we ought to let them have
it?' And he said, 'I guess so.' " (R. 440) Later on in
March of 1949 he told the plaintiff that he wanted $25.00
an acre (which was $5.00 an acre more than was paid for
the property) and plaintiff said he would not pay.
(R. 440-442)
On cross-examination the defendant Roland Toombs
admitted that his testimony before the court differed in
several respects with the testimony given in his deposition because ''I found out different since then.'' He admitted that he had been told by the surveyor Griffiths
about the conflict on the location of the home and other
improvements before acquiring the property; (R. 448)
that he first talked about putting the property in Jack's
name when he was in Ogden to bid on the property.
(R. 449)
With respect to the meeting at his father Al 's he
testified:
'' Q. The purpose of your going down to Al 's
place on about the fourth of January, 1949, was to
discuss the arrangement for turning over the
deeds to Joe, wasn't it~

''A.

Discuss the property, yes. Took it over.

''Q. And at that time you agreed to turn the
property over to him, didn't you~
29
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"A. y es,
'' Q. And
"A. Yes,

.
s1r.
your son Jack was there~
sir." (R. 454)

Before this meeting defendant Roland Toonbs had
offered to pay plaintiff what he had in the property if
he would figure it out, but plaintiff later came back and
stated, ''he was going to keep it. ' ' ( R. 456)
JACK DONALD TOOMBS, one of the defendants
and the son of the defendant Roland Toombs, (R. 459)
testified that he went to Ogden on the day that the bid
was put in for the property but not the next day when
the deed was delivered. (R. 461, 462) He testified that
before the property was purchased he had heard plaintiff tell Roland Toombs that plaintiff did not want the
property, (R. 464) but he further testified that he agreed
with his father after the property was purchased to sell
it to the plaintiff. (R. 467)
On cross-examination he testified that he ratified and
approved all that his father and grandfather had done on
his behalf in acquiring the property. (R. 471) He knew
that the plaintiff claimed an interest in the property for
many years before it was purchased and that plaintiff'had
run cattle on the place most of the time. (R. 475) His
father Roland and he had discussed the facts of the case
with their counsel Mr. Mason before the original answer
was prepared in which it "\Vas admitted that there was an
agreement between plaintiff and defendant Alma Toombs
whereby the latter would purchase the land for plaintiff.
(R. 478-481)
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EMMA M. TOOBS testified that she is the wife of
the defendant Roland Toombs and the mother of Jack
Donald r_roombs; that she was with her husband at the
home of the plaintiff during the fall of 1948 and heard
the plaintiff state that the defendant Alma Toombs had
talked to him about the dispute over the boundary lines
and that she had repeated he couldn't have done so hecause at that time the Glasmanns "didn't know there was
any dispute about where the boundry line was." (R 484)
The foregoing summary of testimony conclusively
establishes that plaintiff purchased with his father the
quarter-section of land consisting of 186¥2 acres and is
the rightful owner of an undivided one-third interest
therein. The only evidence to the contrary is the statement of Alma Toombs that he sold the property to plaintiff's father. However, plaintiff's father in his affidavit
(Exhibit 3) states "A number of years ago my son, J oseph and I, entered into an agreement with my brother,
Alma Toombs, whereby we agreed to purchase 186.50
acres of ground in Sec. 34, Twp. 11 N.R. 7 W., SLM,
known as Cedar Springs property in Box Elder County,
Utah." Surely the elderly Mr. J. M. Toombs (who is the
predecessor in interest of defendants Roland and Jack
D. Toombs) should know more about the matter than
any one else. All of the defendants admitted they knew
of plaintiff's possession of the property for approximately forty years and knew of his claim before they obtained title. We do not understand how the trial court
could have failed to find in favor of the plaintiff on this
proposition.
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II.
ERROR OF THE TRIAL COURT IN FAILING TO
IMPOSE A CO·NSTRUCTIVE TRUST IN ALL OF
THE REAL PROPERTY CO,NSISTING OF APPROXIMATELY 2461;2 ACRES AND REQTJIRING
DEFENDANTS TO ACCOUNT TO PLAINTIFF
FOR THE RENTS, ISSUES AND PR.OFITS RECEIVED THEREFR0M.
1

What has been said above with respect to the weight
and effect of the evidence relating to plaintiff's one-third
interest in the Cedar Springs property applies likewise
to the testimony with respect to plaintiff's claim that
Alma Toombs had agreed with plaintiff to purchase the
land for him. The original Answer admitted this (R. 494)
but claimed the agreement was within the Statute of
Frauds. The court found that Alma. Toombs ''was not
at any time employed as an agent and trustee by Joseph
G. Toombs, the plaintiff herein, to purchase the last above
described real property for Joseph G. Toombs from
Edris Glasmann" (R. 517). This finding is an absolute
contradiction of the testimony of the defendant Alma
Toombs, who admitted that he had agreed to endeavor to
buy the property for plaintiff. He attempts to exonerate
himself by saying that this agreement was rescinded.
However, the evidence is clear that plaintiff at all times
wanted the property. He told his sisters he ''anted it and
should be entitled to it. He "\Yas unable to deal on the
matter himself because of the animosity his sister Edris
Glasmaru1 had for him, and therefore endeavored to haYe
Arnold Christenson acquire the property on his behalf.
When this failed, he made arrangements "\vith Alma
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Toombs to buy the property for him and told Mr. Christenson to forget the matter. Likewise, his testimony is
clear that the only interest the defendants had in the
property was to protect themselves in the acquisition of
the corner on which their buildings may have been located. Each of the defendants testified that even subsequent to the acquisition of the property by them they
agreed to turn it over to the plaintiff and plaintiff has at
all times stood ready, 'villing and able to pay them the
amount of the purchase price upon their delivering a
deed to him less the two acres in the upper northeast corner of the quarter section.
The issue raised by defendants initially and which
was argued at length to the trial court was to the effect
that a constructive trust could not be imposed under the
facts of this case. We respectfully submit that the law
is well settled that a constructive trust should be imposed
under such a situation.
A good discussion on the subject of constructive
trusts is contained in American Jurisprudence, Volume
54, under the title of Trusts. Section 241 of Trusts ( volume 54) Am. Jur. 184, contains the following quotation:
''All authorities agree upon the principle that a
constructive trust will arise where, in addition to
the breach of agreement to purchase for the owner
or one having an interest at such a sale, there are
circumstances of fraud or abuse of confidence, conduct, or facts that would tend to raise an equitable
estoppel to assert the defense of the statute of
frauds. A constructive trust will be declared
where it appears that the promises or principal
33
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furnished the purchase money or a part thereof;
refrained from bidding by reason of the agreement, promise, or agency; relaxed his efforts to
save the property from being sold, or to prevent a
sale at a sacrifice; or where it appears/that the
promisor or agent bought in the property at a
price greatly below its value, or that the agreement was known to other possible bidders and as a
consequence chilled their bidding.
Likewise, the Restatement on the Law of Restitution
sets out the principle of law applicable to this case, as
follows:
"(1) A fiduciary '''"ho purchases from a third
person for himself individually property which it
is his duty to purchase for the beneficiary holds it
upon a constructive trust for the beneficiary.
'' (2) A person who agrees with another to purchase property on behalf of the other and purchases the property for himself individually holds
it upon a constructive trust for the other, even
though he is not under a duty to purchase the
property for the other.'' (Restatement of Restitution, Section 194, Pages ·795, 796)
Scott of Trusts, Volume 3, Section 499, has the following to say with reference to a purchase by a fiduciary
of property which he should purchase for another:
"A person in a fiduciary relation to another who
purchases property for himself indiYiduall~.,. may
be chargeable as constructi Ye trustee of the property, even though he purchases it from a third person and not from himself as fiduciary. He is
chargeable as a constructiYe trustee where he purchases for himself individually property \vhirh
he should purchase for the beneficiary.''
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This authoritative work in the field of trusts then
goes on to state that the question involved is one of determining whether the fiduciary relationship exists, and
discusses the various situations in which the relationship
would automatically arise, among them being the relationship of family, guardian and ward, principal and
agent, employer and employee, and so forth. After discussing various relationships of this nature the author
states the following :
''Even though there was no pre-existing fiduciary
relation, and even though the defendant was not
employed professionally by the complainant, and
even though no continuing fiduciary relation was
contemplated, yet if the defendant undertakes
with the complainant to purchase property for
him, and purchases the property for himself, he
can be charged as constructive- trustee of the property. Although the oral undertaking is not enforceable as a contract, because of lack of consideration or because the property is an interest in
land, yet a fiduciary relation was created and the
fiduciary will not be permitted to profit through
a breach of his duty as fiduciary. By undertaking
to purchase the property for the complanant, the
relation of principal and agent was created. Such
a relation arises where one person undertakes to
act for and in behalf of another, even though the
undertaking is gratuitous and oral. Accordingly,
it is held that a person who undertakes to purchase land for another and who purchases it for
himself is chargeable as constructive trustee of the
property, even though the undertaking is gratuitous and oral. In Harrop v. Cole [85 N.J. Eq. 32,
95 Atl. 378; Aff'd 86 N.J. Eq. 250, 98 Atl. 1085]
the complainants orally employed the defendant to
purchase certain land for them, but the defendant
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purchased the land with his own money and took
a conveyance to himself. The court gave a decree
establishing a constructive trust for the complainants and directing the defendant to convey
the land to the complainants upon payment of the
price. The court said that where one man assumes
to act as agent for another and the other reposes
confidence in him, a fiduciary relation arises, although there is no written contract or no contract
at all. If the agent violates his duty as fiduciary,
a constructive trust arises. The court said that it
was immaterial that there was no antecedent fiduciary relation, and that it arose contemporaneously with the particular transaction.''
This court has previously considered the matter of
imposing a constructive trust. In the case of Haws v.
Jensen., 116 Utah 212, 209 P. 2d 229, this court had before
it the question of imposing a constructive trust where
the decedent had executed a warranty deed to her daughter with the understanding that her daughter would hold
the property for the use and benefit of the other children.
The facts, therefore, are not in point, but the principles
of law laid down by the court are of particular importance
in the following respects :
1. As to whether it would be necessary to have any
statement in writing in order to impose a constructive
trust, the court held:
''Admittedly there is no "~riting eYidencing Mrs.
Haws' intention that the property conYeyed by
her he held in trust by Amer. Ho"\\rever, under certain circumstances existing at the time a conYeyance in trust is made, no 'vriting eYidencing an
intent to create a. trust is required. In those in36
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stances, equity will impress a constructive trust
upon the property in favor of the person or persons designated by the grantor as the beneficiary
or beneficiaries of the oral trust. A constructive
trust, being an equitable remedy to prevent unjust
enrichment, arises by operation of law and is not
within the statute of frauds.''
2. With respect to the facts necessary to show a
confidential or fiduciary relationship, the Supreme Court
stated: (quoting from Scott on Trusts, volume 1, Section
42.2)
''A constructive trust is imposed even if there is
no fiduciary rela.tionshi p such as that between attorney and client, principal and agent, trustee and
beneficiary; it is sufficient that there is a family
relationship or other personal relationship of such
a character that the transferor is justified in believing that the transferee will act in his interest."
Restatement of the Law of Trust, Sec. 44, comment (c), accord. A constructive trust will be imposed even though at the time of the transfer the
transferee intended to perform the agreement, and
even though he was not guilty of undue influence
in procuring the conveyance. The abuse of the confidenital relation consists merely in the failure of
the transferee to perform his promise. Scott on
Trusts, Vol. 1, Sec. 44.2. A court of equity in
decreeing a constructive trust, is bound by no unyielding formula, but is free to effect justice according to the equities peculiar to each transaction
wherever a failure to perform a duty to convey
property would result in unjust enrichment. 3
Bogert on Trusts and Trustees, Part 1, 1946 Ed.
§ 471."
In the case of Barrett v. Vickers, 100 Utah 534, 116 P.
2d 772, where the plaintiff sought to evict certain de37
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fendants from the property, a counter-claim was :filed by
defendants and intervenors for the purpose of imposing a
constructive trust on property which had therefore belonged to S.D. Vickers. The facts in the Vickers Case are
quite similar to those contained in the instant li-;_,lgation.
There the evidence revealed that at the time of the death
of S. D. Vickers, he owned a ranch near Nephi, Utah,
which was mortgaged to the State of Utah. Because of
the inability of his estate to continue the payments the
State foreclosed on the mortgage and the property was
about to he taken over by it. Prior to the expiration of
the period of redemption the family met together and
discussed the possibility of repurchasing the land from
the State. Thereafter, on or about July 21, 1938, the
plaintiff Arliean Vickers Barrett entered into a contract
with the State to repurchase the ranch, to which contract
her husband, George C. Barrett, became a party in December 1938. The other parties to the action claimed
that the plaintiffs George Barrett and his wife Arliean
Vickers Barrett, had agreed to acquire the property for
the benefit of all of the children and that they were
therefore entitled to their pro rata interest in the property. The evidence discloses that because some of the
children were financially embarrassed the agreement was
made that George C. Barrett "rould advance part of their
payment, whereas ,one of the other children would advance the balance. It further appeared that the State of
Utah refused to deal with any of the children except
George Barrett and his 'v~fe. The lo,ver court found from
the evidence that the plaintiff, George Barrett and wife,
were constructive trustees for the use and benefit of the
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other children of the decedent to the extent of the agreement whieh was entered into and not merely to the extnt of
the amount of money paid by each, so that the plaintiffs
and other children would each have an undivided onefourth in the property when it was paid for.
One of the defenses raised in that case was that the
agreement, if any, wa~ (\Tal and therefore within the
statute of frauds. In disposing of this point the court
held: (quoting from the syllabus)
''Parol evidence is admissable to show a trust relationship by operation of law.''
''Evidence which was sufficiently clear, unequivocal and explicit to show that ranch which had
been bought by plaintiffs from state under agreement with defendants and intervenors that each
family was to have an undivided one-fourth interest and that plaintiffs and intervenors advanced
down-payment but later defendants tendered their
shares, established a ''trust'' in plaintiffs for each
family of an undivided one-fourth interest in the
ranch.''
In the case of Hawkins v. Perry (Utah 1953) 253 P.
2d, 372, the court imposed a constructive trust where the
plaintiff had given money to his uncle, a minister of the
gospel, to be used in purchasing a home, with the understanding that title would be taken in the uncle's name
until the plaintiff became of age. The facts disclosed that
the uncle had taken the home in the name of himself and
wife and that the uncle's interest was subsequently
acquired by his wife in divorce proceedings. The court
held that under the circumstances the evidence not only
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showed a confidential relationship between the plaintiff
and the uncle but also that the wife was not a bona fide
'
purchaser in due course and had no beneficial interest in
the realty as against the plaintiff.
Cases from other jurisdictions also support the
plaintiff's position in this matter. In Maddox v. Maddox,
151 Neb. 626, 38 N.W. 2d 547 (1949) the plaintiffs brought
an action to have the trial court declare and enforce a
constructive trust with relation to a one-fifth interest in
the estate of Wesley H. Maddox, deceased. The action
was brought against one of the heirs and his wife, by certain other heirs. The testimony disclosed that William
M. Maddox, husband of defendant, proposed to the other
children of decedent that they buy the one-fifth interest of
th widow (a second wife) of the decedent to which the
other children agreed. However, notwithstanding that
he was designated and authorized to act as agent for the
others to acquire the interest, he made negotiations with
the widow but did not complete the purchase in conformity with the agreement. Rather, thereafter, on October
9, 1947, defendant's wife, with full notice and knowledge
of the agreement aforesaid and in violation thereof,
bought the one-fifth interest of the "Tidow, paying by
check drawn upon their joint bank account. Even though
the property was purchased by the 'Yife of the defendant
(the latter being the one who plai11tiffs claimed was obligated to make purchase for plaintiffs) the court held:
''This court has also adhered to the rule that
where one person undertakes as agent to purchase
property for another, the other to pay part or all
40
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of the purchase price and become owner of all
or a part of the property proportionate to his contribution, the purchase price thereof by such person in his own name or otherwise for himself, gives
rise to a constructive trust for the benefit of the
other in the agreed proportion, conditioned upon
reimbursement for the agreed part of the purchase price. Johnson v. Hayward, 74 Neb. 157,
103 N.W. 1058, 107 N.W. 384, 5 L.R.A.N.S., 112,
12 Am. Cas. 800; Lamb v. Sandall, 135 Neb. 300,
281 N.W. 37; Watkins v. Waits, 148 Neb. 543, 28
N.W. (2d) 206; Restatement, Restitution, s. 194
P. 795.
''This court has repeatedly held that the statute of
frauds, sections 36-103 and 36-104, R.S. 1943, does
not apply to a constructive trust growing out of an
undertaking by one person as agent to purchase
property for another, where, in violation of his
agreement, he has taken the title in his own name
or otherwise for himself and refuses to convey
after tender of the agreed part of the purchase
price. '' (Italics added)
By way of summary the court concluded:
''Finally, it will be remembered that defendant
William M. Maddox, while acting in a confidential
and fiduciary capacity, could not acquire the title
to the interests involved without the approval or
ratification of all plaintiffs, and his wife, also in a
confidential relation, would be equally barred from
doing so, because said defendant could not do
indirectly that which he could not do directly. The
rule generally is tha.t where a pa~rty acting as
agent or trustee is barred from purcha.sing property because of a confidenti.al or fiducia.ry relationship, the husba;nd or wife of such party is
equally barred, and no advantage can be gained
by purchasing the property a;nd taking the title
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thereto in the name of such husband or wife. In
re Estate of Jurgensmeier, 142 Neb. 188, 5 N.W.
(2d) 233; In re Estate- of Statz, 144 Neb. 154, 12
N.W. (2d) 829; Johnson v. Hayward, Supra; 26
Am. Jur., Husband and Wife, s. 127, p. 752; 54
Am. Jur., Trusts, s. 466, p. 370; 65 C. J. Trusts
s. 646, p. 775.'' (Italics added)
Other eases where the Courts have imposed a constructive trust are: Sime v. Malouf, 95 Cal. App. 2d 82,
212 P. (2d) 946, where the court held that one who assumes a position of trust and confidence is a fiduciary
and as long as trust and confidence is deposed in him
he, remains such fiduciary.

Raper v. Thorn (Oklahoma 1949) 211 P. (2d) 1007.
Here plaintiff and defendant were neighbors occupying
farms in the same area, and were warm friends. There
was approximately 120 acres of land lying between the
two farms which was advertised for public sale in pursuance of a decree of partition. The parties agreed or
between themselves that the defendant was to attend the
sale and purchase the entire tract for the benefit of himself and the plaintiff, the plaintiff to acquire 40 acres and
the defendant to own 80 acres. They were advised by a
banker that it was not necessary to have such agreement in 'vriting. The plaintiff also offered to pay the
defendant the amount of the money which might be
neceessary to purchase the land but the defendant refused
to take it, stating that he "'"ould not need the check until
the purchase was made. Although plaintiff claimed that
he relied upon the defendant's promise to bid in the land
for benefit of both and did not attend the sale, he never42
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theless had his attorney there. The defendant acquired
the property at the sale but thereafter requested the
plaintiii to wait until the sale was confirmed before turning over to the plaintiff the amount which plaintiff was
to receive. On learning of the confirmation of sale Mr.
Presson, attorney for the plaintiff, went to the home of
the defendant to close the matter and was then advised
that it would be necessary to take the matter up with
the defendant's son and the son's wife, to whom defendant had sold the property. Thereafter, at a meeting with
the children, they refused to make the conveyance, whereupon suit was instituted. It appeared that the son, Clarence Raper, was fully conversant with the oral agreement
which had theretofore existed between his father and
plaintiff. As was claimed in this case, the defendant testified that before the sale he advised Presson, plaintiff's attorney that the agreement was rescinded; that he was not
going to recognize any agreement as binding ; and would
~Jindependentl ythereof. Inasmuch as Presson attended
the sale, the defendant contended that the plaintiff would
not be entitled to rely upon the agreement. The court,
however, imposed a constructive trust.
Evanoff v. Hall, 310 Mich. 487, 17 N.W. (2d) 724,
where suit was commenced by the plaintiff to establish
and enforce a constructive trust with respect to land
which had been purchased by the defendant. The facts of
the case reveal that plaintiff and defendant were both

residents of the City of Flint and had been friends for
some time. Plaintiff was an attorney and had represented defendant on occasions in the past. On the day
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in question, the defendant called upon plaintiff and during their visit plaintiff advised him that there was to be
a scavenger sale of certain real property known as Lot
509, which was located adjacent to plaintiff's home property. Plaintiff told defendant that he intended to buy it
whereupon the the defendant said that he intended to be
at the scavenager sale on that day to buy some lots for
himself and would buy the lot for the plaintiff. On the
day of the sale plaintiff 'vas detained in his office
and was unable to attend, but the defendant attended and
bid the lot in his own name for $95.00. Thereafter, plaintiff called the defendant and defendant stated that he
would turn the property over to him - there was nothing to worry about. The defendant admitted that there
had been an agreement to buy the property for the plaintiff but stated that the plainti~ told him that he would
be there at the sale and buy the property and therefore,
when he failed to sho'v up, defendant purchased the property for himself. See also Trippensee v. Rice, 312 Mich.
233, 20 N.W. (2d) 172.
Again, in the case of Bigby v. Tho~rson. 319 Mich. 524,
30 N.W. (2d) 266, the court held that actual fraud is not
necessary to give rise to a constructive trust, but if the
circumstances are such as to render it inequitable for the
holder of the legal title to retain it, the court may charge
it with a trust in favor of the equitable owner.
In Stein v. Soref, 255 '\Tis. 42, 38 N.W. (2d) 3, an
action was brought by the plaintiffs against the defendant for an adjudication that the plaintiffs are the owners of an interest in an undivided one-fourth interest in
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certain real property, title to which appeared to be in
the name of the defendant. In that case there had been
negotiations between the plaintiffs and defendant to the
effect that th edefendant would acquire the property for
the benefit of the plaintiffs as well as the defendant. The
evidence showed that the property \vas acquired and that
the defendant had failed to account to the plaintiffs for
the undivided interest which they were to receive. Under
such circumstances, the court he~d, ''equity converts the
defendant into a trustee and thus there is present in these
transactions a constructive trust created by operation of
law," citing Bea.tty v. Guggenhim Exploration Company,
225 N. Y. 380, 122 N.E. 378; K rzysko v. Gudyniski., 207
Wis. 608, 242 N.W. 186; Schofield v. Rideout, 233 Wis.
550, 290 N.W. 155, 133 A.L.R. 834.
See, also, Bla.ck v. Gray, 403 Ill. 503, 87 N.E. (2d)
635; Rankin v. Saitir, 75 Cal. App. 2d 691, 171 P. 2d 78;
Johnson v. Cla~rk, 7 Cal (2d) 529, 61 P. (2d) 767; Getken
v. Shell, 168 Kan. 244, 212 P. (2d) 329; Mackay v. Baker·,
327 Mich. 57, 41. N.W. (2d) 331. (In the latter case the
court held the evidence was sufficient to establish a constructive trust although based on the plaintiff's testimony alone, uncorroborated by the testimony of independent witnesses.
In the Satir Case, supra, the court discusses the difference between resulting and constructive trusts and
holds as to constructive trusts as follows:
''Constructive trusts of this form are not based
primarily on the intention of the parties but are
forced on the conscience of the trustee by equitable
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construction and the operation of law. Millard v.
Hathaway, 27 Cal. 119. In such trusts, ?ased upon
fraud or wrongdoing, an oral promise IS sufficient
and the existence or absence of a confidential relationship between the parties, in the strict sense,
is not controlling. Brison v. Brison, 7' Cal. 525,
17 P. 689, 7 Am. St. Rep. 189. "Such trusts are
creatures of equity, and take form whenever title
is obtained by means of chicanery, deceit, or other
variety of fraud, actual or constructive.'' Sanguinetti v. Rossen, 12 Cal. App. 623, 107 P. 560, 562.
In order to create a constructive or involuntary
trust, as defined in section 2224 of the Civil Code,
no conditions other than those stated in that section are necessary. Lauricella v. Lauricella, 161'
Cal. 61, 118 P. 430. By section 2223 of that code
the rule of constructive trust is extended to the
case where one person wrongfully detains a thing
from another. The rule extends to almost any case
where there is a wrongful acquisition or detention
of property to which another is entitled, since it is
based upon the equitable principle that no one may
take advantage of his own wrong. Civ. Code, sec.
3517. As was said in Brazil v. Silva, 181 Cal. 490,
185 P. 174, 176. 'The instances of its application
are as various nearly as the ways in which property can be wrongfully acquired.' ''
In Plant v. Schrock, 102 Old. 97, 227 P. 439, appears
the following statement in the syllabus :
''A sale by a guardian of real estate belonging to
his ward to his sister-in-la:\v through the interposition of a third person, \vith the secret understanding that the purchaser not pay for the same
and for the purpose of securing a loan thereon,
constitutes a fraud on the estate of the minor and
may be set aside against the parties to the fraud
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and any person not a bona fide purchaser for
value, but such sale is not void.''
A good annotation on the subject IS contained in
27 A.L.R. (2d) 1285, supplementing earlier annotations
found in 42 A.L.R. 10 and 135 A.L.R. 232.
This is an equity case and the court should invoke
the equitable principles set forth above to prevent the
defendants from obtaining an unjust enrichment at the
expense of the plaintiff. If defendants should claim
that plaintiff has no remedy because title to the property
was taken in the name of Jack Donald Toombs instead of
Alma or Roland, the case of Hawkins v. Peery, supra, and
Maddox v. Maddox, fully answer this argument.
Too, the Findings of the court (which were prepared
by counsel for defendants) state ''that the said transaction of the sale and purchase ... was concluded by Alma
Toombs, grandfather of Jack Donald Toombs, as agent
and for the use and benefit of Jack Donald Toombs''
(Finding No. 13, R. 517). With this Finding we agree.
However, "\Ve cannot, because of such Finding, agree with
the subsequent Finding No. 19 to the effect that Jack
Donald Toombs ''did not at any time have any knowledge
of any conversation, if there was such conversation,
whereby Joseph G. Toombs had asked Alma Toombs to
purchase the last above described real property for him
from Edris Glasmann. '' It is elementary law that the
principal is bound by the knowledge of his agent in connection with the agent's employment.
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The evidence in this case, when considered in the
light of the principles of the law applicable thereto, required the trial court to impose a constructive trust in
favor of the plaintiff.

III.
ER.ROR OF THE TRIAL COURT IN EFUSING TO
REO·PEN THE CASE.

After counsel for defendants failed to submit any
proposed Findings or Conclusions for four years from
the time the court announced its determination of the
issues, plaintiff felt compelled to file a Motion to reopen
the case for the purpose of rearaguing the matter with
or without additional estimony (R. 512). This Motion in
effect constituted a Motion for a new trial under the provisions of Rule 59 (a) and 59 (e) U.R.C P. While counsel has not been able to find any decisions in respect to
his present argument that failure to grant such Motion
was error, lack of any authority on the matter would seem
to indicate that no court had in the past taken such a protracted length of time to conclude a case or to enter
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of La"·, and Decree after
having decided the issues. Rule ( 41 (b) provides for dismissal of an action for failure of plaintiff to pursue his
action with reasonable diligence but no apparent relief
is afforded to a party ,x;here the eourt - 'Yhether trial or
appellate - takes an unreasonable and unconscionable
length of time to decide the issues bet,Yeen the parties and
render its judgment or decision thereon. As has recently happened in another case in which eouusel 'vas
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interested, serious material damage has resulted from
the failure of the court to perform its function with reasonable promptitude. It appears to counsel that under
such circumstances the proper and equitable course of
action to pursue would be to allow the parties to be
heard on the merits - if necessary, before a different
judge - in order that justice be accomplished. A complete review of the evidence in this case, as has been made
herein, should have been made. We feel confident that
such a review would have required a determination of
the issues in favor of plaintiff.
SUMMARY
In conclusion, we would like to summarize for the
benefit of the court.
I. Plaintiff is the o'vner of an undivided one-third
interest in the 1861;2 acres of land described in the
complaint:
A. He purchased the land in about 1906 with his
father from the defendant Alma Toombs :
1. Not only testified by the witnesses but admitted by defendants in their original answer.
2. Affidavit of Joseph M. Toombs to that effect
appears as Exhibit 3, together with testimony
that Joseph M. Toombs on more than one occasion stated his son owned one-third of the land.
B. Plaintiff paid the taxes on the land.

C. Defendants had knowledge that plaintiff had
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been in possession of the property for over 40
years, and claimed a one-third interest therein.
D. During the time plaintiff has been in possession of the land he has assisted in fencing it so
that it is entirely enclosed and has occupied it exclusively since 1940.
II. The Court should impose a constructive trust on
the balance of the land, making the defendants contructive trustees as to the entire tract for the benefit of the
plaintiff. Upon paying the amount of the purchase price
by plaintiff the defendants should be required to convey
to said plaintiff and account for the rents, issues and
profits received by them.
A. Property ·w,.as deeded by Joseph :JI. Toombs to
his daughter Edris Glasmann, without consideration, for the sole purpose of having her sell it to
pay his medical and hospital expenses and with
the expressed desire that his son Joseph G. Toombs
be given the first opportunity to purchase.
B. Although plaintiff made two bids on the property it did not appear that he would be able to
acquire it; nor did his sister eYer contact plaintiff personally in an attempt to sell it to him.
C. Defendant Alma Toombs, \Yith the knowledge
of defendants Roland Toombs and Jack Donald
Toombs, agreed "~ith plaintiff that he, Alma
Toombs, would acquire the land for the plaintiff
if plaintiff 'vould conYey approximately t""'"o acres
to defendant to protect the latter in connection
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with certain improvements located on adjoining
land.
1. The fact that such agreement existed was
testified to by plaintiff and certain of his witnesses and admitted by each of the defendants.
2. The agreement between plaintiff and defendant Alma Toombs was admitted by the original Answer filed by defendants and later admitted by them in their depositions, but defendants later contended that the defendant Alma
Toombs had rescinded it. (Note: The court
made no finding on this.)
3. All parties, including defendant, testified
that at at the meeting in Alma Toombs' home
in January 1949, the defendants agreed to turn
the property over to the plaintiff, but requested
time "to have it -surveyed again so as to ascertain
exactly the portion needed to protect defendants'
out buildings.
D. In violation of the agreement with plaintiff,
Defendant Alma Toombs, with his son Roland who
had knowledge of the agreement, purchased the
property and put in the name of Jack Donald
Toombs.
III. If the trial court had granted plaintiff's Motion
to reopen the case for the purpose of reargument, or to
take additional testimony, the overwhelming force of
the evidence, as reported hereinabove, would have re-
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quired the trial court to reverse its decision and enter
judgment in favor of the plaintiff.
A~

The trial court manifestly abused its discretion
in refusing to reopen the matter after more than
five years had elapsed from the submission of the
case to it.
We respectfully submit that the decision of the trial
court should be reversed and the cause remanded with
instructions to enter judgment in favor of the plaintiff
and against the defendants and requiring defendants to
account to plaintiff for the rents, issues and profits derived by them from the use and occupation of the property in question since 1949.
Respectfully submitted,

ARTHUR H. NIELSEN
OMER CALL
Attorneys for
Plaintiff and Appellant
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